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RECENT CASES
LEHR V. ROBERTSON: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS
The state, as parens patriae,' has an interest in promoting and protecting
the welfare of children. When acting in this parental capacity, the state
substitutes its authority for that of the natural parents. When child custody
or adoption is at issue, conflicts often arise between parental rights and the
state's interest in the welfare of children. In resolving these conflicts, the
courts generally apply a "best interest of the child" standard.' Although
this standard is incapable of precise definition, it embodies several social,
psychological, and economic factors including the parents' fitness and
children's preference.' Thus, while parents' rights to the custody and con-
1. The term "parens patriae" is literally defined as "parent of the country." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Traditionally, this term referred to the state's role as
sovereign and guardian of legally disabled persons. Id. This protective doctrine originally ex-
tended only to the mentally incompetent. See Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens
Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). The state's power over children did not arise out of the
crown's protective or paternal interest. Rather, it resulted from the feudal tenurial system which
made the wardships of minor heirs very profitable to the crown. Id. at 196-99.
Gradually, the scope of the parens patriae doctrine was increased to include children as well
as mental incompetents. By the early nineteenth century, the king's parens patriae power was
exercised to promote the physical and moral welfare of all children, regardless of their wealth
or their parents' status. Id. at 206. The use of the doctrine to serve broad humanitarian prin-
ciples has continued in American law. Id. at 207.
2. By the nineteenth century, the best interest of the child standard was firmly established
in the common law. See J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
47 (5th ed. 1895). In applying the best interest standard in a custody or neglect proceeding,
the court's primary objective is to secure the welfare of the child. Regardless of the parents'
claims, the child's welfare is treated as paramount. Id. § 248.
The best interest standard was first explicitly articulated by an American court in Finlay
v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). In the case, Justice Cardozo explained the role
of the court in a child custody dispute:
[The chancellor] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the
child. . . . He is not determining rights "as between a parent and child" or as be-
tween one parent and another .... Equity does not concern itself with such disputes
in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is for the child.
Id. at 433-34, 148 N.E. at 626.
3. The factors most often utilized by the courts in applying the best interest standard are
illustrated by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act:
The Court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
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trol of their children were once absolute as to third parties,4 these rights
now may be subordinated to the state's interest in the children's welfare.
The state's power to intervene in the parent-child relationship, however,
is limited by the parents' constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection.' The United States Supreme Court has ruled that family
autonomy6 and parents' interests in raising their children7 give rise to a liberty
interest8 protected by due process. Additionally, equal protection guarantees
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not af-
fect his relationship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979 & Supp. 1983). For a further
discussion of the criteria used by courts in applying this standard, see Foster & Freed, Child
Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 438-43 (1964).
4. The parental rights doctrine provides that a natural parent, unless proven unfit, has
an absolute right over a non-parent to the custody of his or her child. McGough & Shindell,
Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Disputes, 27
EMORY L.J. 209, 212 (1978). The doctrine's presumption of the natural parent's right to custody
may be subordinated, however, to the best interests of the child standard. Id. For detailed
discussion and recommendations concerning the modern tension between the parental rights
doctrine and the best interests of the child standard, see Foster & Freed, supra note 3; McGough
& Shindell, supra.
5. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "INor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Supreme Court also has limited the state's intervention into family relationships through
reliance on the first amendment right to freedom of religion. See, e.g., Yoder v. Wisconsin,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory education statute violates right of Amish parents to raise
children according to their own religious principles). Moreover, the Court has found a right
to privacy in family matters to exist in a "penumbra" emanating from other amendments.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right of privacy, whether derived from fourteenth
or ninth amendment, encompasses woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (Bill of Rights creates zone of privacy which the
state violated by prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples).
6. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (zoning ordinance that
prohibits extended family violates due process rights of family members to decide living ar-
rangements); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 150, 166 (1944) (recognizing "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter").
7. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (parent has protected interest in "compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (statute mandating public education unreasonably interferes with liberty
of parents to direct upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) (liberty guaranteed by fourteenth amendment includes freedom to marry, establish
family, and raise children).
8. The term "liberty," as used in the due process clause, has been broadly construed by
the Court. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (liberty is a broad,
majestic term gathering meaning over time). Although it has never been strictly defined, liberty
encompasses many different interests. The concept of due process liberty includes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The historical development of the concept of
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extend to family members who are discriminated against on the basis of
gender9 or illegitimacy."
The rights of putative fathers' regarding their illegitimate children have
been adjudicated by the Supreme Court over the last decade.' 2 Recently,
in Lehr v. Robertson,'3 the Court held that when a putative father fails to
establish a significant relationship with his child, the father has neither a
right to actual notice of, nor a right to be heard prior to, the adoption
of his illegitimate child.' 4 In determining substantive and procedural due pro-
cess guarantees, the Lehr Court relied foremost on the extent to which a
parent-child relationship had developed; accordingly, Lehr deemphasized the
importance of a biological relationship between parent and child. Basing its
decision on a questionable reading of federal precedent,' 5 the Court failed
to articulate a clear standard for determining what constitutes a "significant
relationship." Consequently, Lehr provided courts and legislatures with little
assistance in deciding when notice to putative fathers is required. The Lehr
decision also alleviates the state's burden of notifying putative fathers prior
to the adoption of their illegitimate children. Thus, the Court's ruling will
have a significant impact on putative fathers who wish to establish and main-
tain relationships with their children.
BACKGROUND
Through a series of cases, the Supreme Court has attempted to outline
the parameters of putative fathers' substantive and procedural rights regard-
due process liberty is explored in Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926). The application of substantive due process principles as
a source of constitutional protection of family rights is discussed thoroughly in Developments
in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1166-87 (1980).
9. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (New York statute giving right to veto
adoption to mother, but not to father, of illegitimate child violated equal protection clause);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statute providing for alimony payments to women
but not to men violated equal protection clause); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977)
(Georgia statute giving right to veto adoption to married or divorced father, but not to putative
father, did not violate equal protection clause).
10. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1979) (statute that permits illegitimate children
to inherit from mother, but not from father, denies them equal protection); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (equal protection requires that illegitimate, as well
as legitimate, children be eligible to recover benefits for parent's disability under workers' com-
pensation statute); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother
may sue in tort for wrongful death of illegitimate as well as legitimate child); Levy v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children have same right as legitimate children to sue
in tort for wrongful death of mother).
I1. A putative father is defined as "the alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
12. The first Supreme Court case that addressed the rights of putative fathers was Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a further discussion of Stanley, see infra notes 16-21 and
accompanying text.
13. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
14. Id. at 2987.
15. Id. at 2992-93.
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ing their children. In Stanley v. Illinois,'6 the Supreme Court invalidated
a state statute that created an irrebuttable presumption that a putative father
was unfit to have custody of his children after the mother's death. 7 The
Court found that although Stanley never married the children's mother, he
had a liberty interest in maintaining custody over them. 8 According to the
Court, this interest derived from both the putative father's biological rela-
tionship to his children and the substantial role he played in raising them.' 9
Thus, the Stanley Court held that due process and equal protection required
that Stanley be allowed to challenge this presumption before the state could
deprive him of custody.2" Moreover, the Court emphasized that these con-
stitutional guarantees did not depend upon the existence of a legal relation-
ship, such as marriage.2' The Court failed, however, to indicate whether
either a father's biological relationship to his children or his role in their
upbringing would be sufficient to extend due process rights to a putative
father.
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott,22 the Court indicated that a putative
father's role in raising his children, rather than the biological relationship
between them, was the focus for determining the father's substantive due
process guarantees.23 The Quilloin Court upheld a Georgia statute that granted
to both parents of legitimate children, but only to mothers of illegitimate
children, the right to withhold consent to adoption.24 The appellant, a putative
father, sought unsuccessfully to block the adoption of his illegitimate child
by the child's step-father.25 The Supreme Court found that because Quilloin
16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. Id. at 649. In Stanley, an unmarried couple lived together for 18 years and raised several
children. Upon the mother's death, the children were declared wards of the state and placed
with court-appointed guardians. Illinois law did not recognize putative fathers as parents. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-714 (1965). Thus, Stanley's children were automatically removed
from his custody because he was presumed unfit to keep them. 405 U.S. at 650.
18. 405 U.S. at 651.
19. Id. Stanley's due process liberty interest was defined as "that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised." Id.
20. Id. at 657-58. The Stanley Court characterized the removal of Stanley's children as
"procedure by presumption." Id. at 647. Although it may be more efficient to make a presump-
tion than an individual determination in every case, the Court concluded that when a pro-
cedure "explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child." id. at 656-67.
21. Id. at 651-52.
22. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
23. See infra note 32. Two distinct rights are derived from the due process clause. The
first is a substantive right that protects the individual's liberty or property interest. The second
is a procedural right that requires that notice and a hearing be held before a protected interest
can be taken away by the government.
24. 434 U.S. at 256. Georgia law requires the consent of each living parent who has not
abandoned the child or otherwise surrendered parental rights. GA. CODE § 74-403 (1975). An
exception is created for the adoptions of illegitimate children; only the mother's consent is
required. Id. § 74-403(3).
25. 434 U.S. at 247.
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had not developed a parental relationship with his child, he did not attain
a liberty interest that would require his consent to the child's adoption.2 6
Thus, Quilloin concluded that the appellant's substantive due process rights
were not violated when the Court allowed the step-father to adopt without
ruling on the appellant's fitness as a parent.27 It is significant to note that
because Quilloin had been able to assert his liberty interest at a previous
hearing, the Court did not address the issue of a putative father's procedural
due process guarantees. 8
In discussing Quilloin's equal protection challenge to the Georgia statute,
the Court ruled that the state may presume that married or divorced fathers
have a greater commitment to their children than do putative fathers.29 Thus,
the Quilloin Court concluded that a distinction between married or divorced
fathers, and putative fathers, for purposes of granting the power to prevent
adoptions, did not violate the equal protection clause."
Although the Quilloin Court limited its decision to the unusual facts
presented in the case, the ruling appeared to subordinate the biological rela-
tionship to the substantial parental role in the child's development.' The
Court held that a putative father must establish a material role in the child's
upbringing before he can be attributed substantive due process rights
26. Id. at 251. Unlike Stanley, Quilloin had never lived with his son or his son's mother.
Although Quilloin was listed as the father on his son's birth certificate and occasionally visited
his son, he only provided financial support on an irregular basis. Id. at 249 & n.6. When
the child was two years old, his mother married the appellee, Walcott. Nine years later, the
mother consented to Walcott's adoption of the child. Quilloin was notified of Walcott's adop-
tion petition by the Georgia Department of Human Resources. Id. at 250 n.7. Subsequently,
he filed a petition to legitimate the child and secure visitation rights. The petitions for adoption
and legitimation were consolidated, and a hearing was held at which both parties offered ex-
tensive evidence. Id. at 250.
The trial court found that although Quilloin was not an unfit parent and had not abandoned
his child, the best interests of the child would be served by granting Walcott's petition for
adoption. Id. at 251. The Georgia Supreme Court, relying on the state's policy in favor of
raising children in a family setting, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Quilloin v. Walcott,
238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
27. 434 U.S. at 256. The Quilloin Court indicated that the due process clause would cer-
tainly be offended if the state were attempting to break up an established family unit without
a showing of parental unfitness. Id. at 255. The Court emphasized, however, that Quilloin
had never had, nor sought, custody of his child and that the adoption gave "full recognition
to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except the appellant." Id.
28. Id. at 253.
29. Id. at 256.
30. Id. The only equal protection issue raised in Quilloin concerned the difference in the
state's treatment of putative fathers and fathers of legitimate children, whether married or
divorced. The Court did not consider Quilloin's claim that the statute made an invidious gender-
based distinction, because the claim was not properly presented in his jurisdictional statement.
Id. at 253 n.13.
31. Id. at 254. The Court phrased the issue very narrowly, confining it to the particular
facts of the case. It is unusual that the determination of a child's legal father would not be
made until the child was 11 years old. The time span involved may have been significant in
the Court's, determination of Quilloin's due process interest. See Note, A Putative Father's
Parental Rights: A Focus on "Family," 58 NEB. L. REV. 610, 617 (1979).
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equivalent to those of married or divorced fathers. Thus, a putative father's
biological link, in the absence of additional considerations, affords him few
substantive guarantees.32
In a further attempt to establish when a parent-child relationship gives
rise to a substantive due process liberty interest, the Court examined the
theory of psychological parenthood33 in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform34 (OFFER). Decided the same term as
Quilloin, OFFER explored the constitutional significance of a psychological
parental relationship when a biological link did not exist. OFFER and in-
dividual foster parents challenged New York's statutory procedure for remov-
ing children from foster homes." The procedure allowed foster parents to
request an evidentiary hearing but did not grant one automatically. 6 OFFER
and the foster parents contended that their liberty interests, guaranteed by
substantive due process, required that a hearing be granted automatically
when the state planned to remove children who had been with a foster family
for over one year."
The Court considered the argument that ties may develop between children
and their foster parents, making the foster family the true "psychological
family." 38 OFFER contended that a psychological family has a liberty in-
terest, under the due process clause, in remaining together. 9 Although the
OFFER Court neither affirmed nor denied the existence of that liberty
interest,4" the Court assumed its presence.' Despite this assumption, however,
the Court held that the state's procedures for removing children from foster
homes were constitutionally adequate to protect this liberty interest. 2 Thus,
32. In Quilloin, the following factors together were insufficient to extend substantive due
process protection to a putative father: an acknowledgment of paternity, naming on the birth
certificate, irregular financial support, occasional visits and gifts for the child, no finding of
parental unfitness, and a desire to continue visitation. One commentator has described these
attributes as characterizing "[a]t best, an uncle-nephew relationship." Note, Unwed Fathers
and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 98-99 (1980).
33. Under the theory of psychological parenthood, the psychological relationship that develops
between a child and a stable, loving parent figure is much more important to the child's well-
being than the biological link between parent and child. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-13 (1973). A psychological parent is defined as
"one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical
needs." Id. at 98. Thus, any person may be a psychological parent. Id.
34. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
35. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 383(2), 400 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18,
§ 450.10 (1976).
36. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 450.10 (1976).
37. 431 U.S. at 839-40.
38. Id. at 839.
39. Id. The appellants relied on Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), which
held that an extended family (consisting of two brothers, a cousin, and their grandmother)
has a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in remaining together as a family unit.
40. 431 U.S. at 847.
41. Id.
42. Id. The liberty interest assumed to exist by the OFFER Court was "one rooted in the
emotional attachments that develop over time between a child and the adults who care for
him." Id. at 854.
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the Court intimated that a psychological relationship, without the biological
link between parent and child, may give rise to a liberty interest worthy
of due process protection. 3
Subsequently, in Caban v. Mohammed," the Court addressed the distinc-
tion between psychological and biological associations in examining the rela-
tionship between a putative father and his child. The Caban Court invalidated
a state statute that allowed the mother, but not the putative father, of an
illegitimate child to block the child's adoption by withholding consent.4 5 When
both parents had attained a similar status, by developing significant custodial
relationships with their child, the Court determined that a gender-based
distinction would violate the equal protection clause.4" The Caban Court noted
43. Id. at 843. Three elements, discussed in dicta, define the Court's concept of family:
the biological relationship, marriage, and the "emotional attachments that derive from the in-
timacy of daily association." Id. at 843-44. The Court stated that "the usual understanding
of 'family' implies biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between
parent and child have stressed this element." Id. at 843. Marriage was defined as "the basic
foundation of the family in our society." Id. Regarding the third factor, the Court stressed
that a biological link is not necessary to the development of a "deeply loving and interdepen-
dent relationship between an adult and the child in his or her care." Id. at 844; see also J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND & A. SOLNIT, supra note 33, at 98.
Recognizing the foster family's important role in providing psychological parenthood, the
OFFER majority concluded that the foster family cannot be dismissed "as a mere collection
of unrelated individuals." 431 U.S. at 844-45; cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974) (group of unrelated roommates do not have protected due process liberty interest in
living together). Justice Stewart, however, in a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, declared that the interest asserted by the foster parents was not protected
by the due process clause. 431 U.S. at 858 (Stewart, J., concurring). The concurring opinion
noted that the purpose of foster care is to provide only a temporary home for the child who
is awaiting adoption or return to his or her natural parents. Id. at 856 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Accordingly, Justice Stewart agreed with the New York Court of Appeals in rejecting
the notion that "third-party custodians may acquire some sort of squatter's rights in another's
child." Id. at 857 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552
n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 n.2 (1976)).
44. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
45. The statute provided:
1. Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born
in wedlock;
(c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
2. The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the child....
For the purposes of this section, evidence of insubstantial and infrequent contacts by
a parent with his or her child shall not, of itself, be sufficient as a matter of law to pre-
clude a finding that such parent has abandoned such child.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § Ill (McKinney 1975). Since Caban, the statute has been amended
to include certain putative fathers. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11l(l)(e) (McKinney 1977 &
Supp. 1983-1984).
46. 441 U.S. at 394. The appellant, Caban, and the appellee, Mohammed, had lived together
for five years and had two children. Although he was never married to the appellee, Caban
was listed as the father on both of the children's birth certificates; he also contributed to the
family's support. Id. at 382. When the appellee left with the children, then aged four and
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that a state may not assume that maternal and paternal roles are signifi-
cantly different.47 Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that the equal protec-
tion clause will extend equivalent substantive rights only to a putative father
whose parental relationship is similar to that of the mother.4 8 The Court
noted in dicta that a putative father who has either abandoned his child
or never come forward to participate in child rearing need not be granted
the privilege of vetoing an adoption. 9 Moreover, the Court declined to ad-
dress the difficulties inherent in the adoption of newborns when the putative
father has not had an opportunity to develop a relationship with the baby."
six, to get married, the appellant continued to have contact with the children. Id. Two years
later, the appellee and her husband filed an adoption petition. The appellant, who also had
married, responded by filing a cross-petition in which he and his wife sought adoption of the
children. Id. at 383. The Surrogate Court of Kings County held a consolidated adoption hear-
ing at which both couples presented evidence. The court granted the Mohammeds' petition
over the objection of the Cabans, id. at 383-84, terminating all of the natural father's rights,
including visitation. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977).
Relying on the unsuccessful constitutional challenge to § 11 in In re Malpica-Orsini, 36
N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsini v.
Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976), both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision. In re David Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d
846, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977). The Orsini court of ap-
peals had upheld the statute, reasoning that to require consent of all putative fathers could
lead to delays in child placement, failure of children to be legitimized, the discouragement
of potential husbands from marrying women with illegitimate children, extortion by the putative
fathers, and harassment of the adoptive families. Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d at 572-74, 331 N.E.2d
at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S. 2d at 516-17.
The Supreme Court dismissed Orsini for lack of a substantial federal question. 423 U.S.
1042 (1976). Three years later, however, the Court found a federal question in the parallel
case of Caban. The Court explicitly overruled Orsini to the extent that its dismissal was incon-
sistent with the Court's decision in Caban. 441 U.S. at 390 n.9.
47. 441 U.S. at 389. The Court rejected the notion that there is a universal difference be-
tween maternal and paternal roles at every phase of child development. Id.
48. Id. at 394.
49. Id. at 392.
50. Id. at 392 n. 11. The Court indicated that the special difficulties of identifying and locating
putative fathers at the births of their children may justify a statute that sets more stringent
requirements for acknowledging paternity or a stricter definition of abandonment. Id. Arguably,
the state has a higher interest in promoting the speed and finality of newborn adoptions, because
newborn children comprise the group that is most attractive to potential adoptive parents. See
Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Putative Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 93, 113 & n.117 (1979). On the other hand, it has been argued that taking additional
time to find the putative fathers of newborns will best serve the interests of both the father
and the child by securing the father's input at an adoption hearing. Note, Putative Fathers:
Unwed But No Longer Unprotected, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 425, 439 (1980).
The New York adoption statute, amended after Caban, affords special consideration to putative
fathers of children who were under the age of six months when placed for adoption. If the
father openly lived with the mother, or if in the six months prior to the birth he held himself
out to be the father and paid a fair amount of medical expenses incurred by the birth, his
consent is required for the child's adoption. N.Y. Doum. REL. LAW § I lI(1)(e) (McKinney 1977
& Supp. 1983-1984).
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Thus, the Caban Court limited its ruling to those situations involving older
children.5 '
Although the Court's decisions prior to Lehr acknowledged a putative
father's potential liberty interest in his relationship with his child, several
significant issues remained unanswered. First, no sufficient criteria were
established for determining the minimum standard that a putative father must
meet to protect his due process liberty interest in his child. Second, there
was no indication of whether the standard required for developing a substan-
tial relationship was the same for both procedural and substantive due pro-
cess guarantees. Finally, a putative father's right to receive actual notice and
a hearing concerning the adoption of his illegitimate child remained uncertain.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY5 2
An unmarried couple, Lehr and Robertson, lived together for approximately
two years until Robertson gave birth to a daughter. 3 Lehr alleged that for
the next two years he diligently tried to establish a relationship with his
daughter, but his efforts were continually frustrated by the mother. 4 Finally,
he threatened to take legal action if he was not allowed to see the child. 5
Robertson, who was married by that time, refused Lehr's demands and con-
sented to the adoption of the child by her husband. 6 Mr. and Mrs. Robert-
son filed an adoption proceeding in the family court for Ulster County, New
York. Because Lehr did not fall within the statutory classification of putative
fathers to whom notice must be given, 7 he did not receive notice of the
51. 441 U.S. at 392. The Caban Court did not define the term "older child." The Caban
children were ages four and six when the adoption proceeding was initiated.
52. Because Lehr was neither notified of, nor extended an opportunity to, participate in
the adoption proceeding, his allegations were never adjudicated. His version of the facts, recorded
in the dissenting opinion, 103 S. Ct. at 2997 (White, J., dissenting), was ignored by the major-
ity. For that reason, much of the factual background will be cited to Justice White's dissent.
53. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Lehr alleged that he and Robertson cohabited prior to the
child's birth. Robertson did not deny this allegation or Lehr's assertion of paternity.
54. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Lehr asserted that Robertson and the baby disappeared upon
their release from the hospital. He persistently searched for them over the next year. When
he finally found them, he visited with the child to the extent permitted by the mother. Shortly
thereafter, Robertson and the baby vanished again. Lehr then hired a private detective who
found the mother and child one year later. By this time, Robertson had married Mr. Robert-
son. She refused Lehr's offers of financial assistance and threatened to call the police if Lehr
tried to see the child. Lehr then retained an attorney, who wrote to the child's mother re-
questing that Lehr be allowed to see the child and threatening legal action if she refused. The
Robertsons responded by initiating the adoption proceeding. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2997-98 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2987-88.
57. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 1ll-a (1977). This statute was passed in response to Stanley
in an attempt to provide notice to putative fathers when such notice was constitutionally re-
quired. See 103 S. Ct. at 2994 & n.20. Section 111-a, in pertinent part, provides:
2. Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall
include:
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proceeding and was allegedly unaware of it.5"
After the Robertsons had initiated the adoption action, Lehr filed a peti-
tion seeking visitation rights and a declaration of his paternity from the family
court in Westchester County, New York." The mother was served with notice
of Lehr's suit and requested an order from the Ulster County court to change
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United
States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has
been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-
two of the social services law;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim pater-
nity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two of the social ser-
vices law;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the
time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in
written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months subse-
quent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument
or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eighty-four-b
of the social services law.
3. The sole purpose of notice under this section shall be to enable the person
served pursuant to subdivision two to present evidence to the court relevant to the
best interests of the child.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § Ill-a (McKinney 1977).
The putative father registry was established by New York Social Services Law § 372-c:
1. The department shall establish a putative father registry which shall record
the names and addresses of . . . any person who has filed with the registry before
or after the birth of a child out of wedlock, a notice of intent to claim paternity
of the child . ..
4. An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be introduced
in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed such notice, in any pro-
ceeding in which such fact may be relevant.
5. The department shall, upon request, provide the names and addresses of per-
sons listed with the registry to any court or authorized agency, and such informa-
tion shall not be divulged to any other person, except upon order of a court for
good cause shown.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1977).
The putative father registry was designed to reduce the following: (1) casework time formerly
spent conducting searches for the putative fathers; (2) costs of notifying putative fathers by
providing for notice by mail rather than by publication; and (3) public costs of foster care
by freeing up children for adoption more quickly. Brief for Appellant at D-4, Lehr v. Robin-
son, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (letter from Sen. J. Pisani to Governor's Counsel). There is some
indication in the legislative history of § 111-a that the sponsors of the bill assumed that notice
would be required to a putative father, like Lehr, who had filed a paternity claim. One sponsor
explained that a putative father who used the registry "has elected not to avail himself of
his right (established by the bill) to institute a paternity proceeding, but, rather, has chosen
the less involved procedure of filing a 'notice of intent' which will also protect his right to
notice of subsequent proceedings affecting the child." Id. at D-8 (emphasis added).
58. 103 S. Ct. at 2989.
59. Id. at 2988-89.
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the venue of the paternity action from Westchester to Ulster County.6" The
Ulster County court issued an order to show cause why venue should not
be changed to allow the adoption and paternity petitions to be heard
together.6 ' Lehr learned of the adoption proceeding for the first time when
he was served with the Ulster County court order.62 He sought to stay the
adoption until his paternity suit was resolved, but learned that the Ulster
County court had signed the adoption decree five days prior to the return
date it had established on the change of venue order. 3 Thereafter, Lehr's
paternity petition was dismissed without prejudice by the Westchester County
court on the Robertsons' motion. Lehr appealed the adoption order and
sought to vacate the decree.6" The Ulster County court issued a memoran-
dum decision denying relief to Lehr,6" which was affirmed by both the Ap-
pellate Division66 and the New York Court of Appeals.67
The court of appeals determined that there had been no abuse of discre-
tion by the Ulster County court either in finalizing the adoption without
notifying Lehr, or in refusing to vacate the decree. 6 Lehr, however, claimed
that the New York statute violated the due process clause by terminating
his parental rights without a hearing and violated the equal protection clause
by extending greater procedural rights to mothers and to classes of putative
fathers that did not include him.69
THE DECISION
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,7" denied relief to Lehr on both
his due process and equal protection claims.7' The majority held that Lehr's
undeveloped relationship with his child resulted in a minimal liberty interest
that was protected adequately by the New York statutory scheme.72 Through
60. Id. at 2989.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2988-89.
63. Id. at 2989. On February 26, 1979, the Ulster County court signed the order to show
cause, submitted by the appellees, to change the venue of the paternity proceeding to Ulster
County. The return date on the motion was March 12, 1979. Lehr was served with notice
of the order on March 3, 1979. Four days later, Lehr's attorney telephoned the Ulster County
court and informed the judge of Lehr's intention to seek a stay of the adoption proceeding.
The judge said he had signed the adoption decree earlier that day. Id.
64. Id.
65. In re Martz, 102 Misc. 2d 102, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979).
66. In re Jessica XX, 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1980).
67. In re Jessica XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981). Lehr relied
on Caban to support his equal protection claim, but because Caban was decided 48 days after
the adoption decree was signed, the court of appeals declined to apply it retroactively. Id.
at 424, 430 N.E.2d at 898-99, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23.
68. Id. at 429-30, 430 N.E.2d at 901-02, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26.
69. Id. at 423-24, 430 N.E.2d at 898, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
70. Justice Stqvens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor.
71. 103 S. Ct. at 2987.
72. See supra note 57.
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its putative father registry, the state had placed Lehr's right to receive notice
completely within his control.73 In addition, the Lehr Court held that because
Lehr had not established a relationship with his child equivalent to that
established by the custodial mother, he was not similarly situated; therefore,
the equal protection clause was not violated.74 The state was not prevented
from treating the two parents differently in guaranteeing the rights to veto
and receive prior notice of an adoption.7"
Focusing on Lehr's due process challenge, the Court examined the precise
nature of the liberty interest threatened by the state." The majority
distinguished between two types of relationships that a putative father may
have with his child. First, a relationship merely consisting in a biological
link was described as inchoate;7 it had the potential for developing into
a full relationship. Second, when a putative father "demonstrate[d] a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood,"7 8 the relationship was
deemed to be developed. Emphasizing that parents' liberty interests depend
on the responsibilities they assume toward their children, the Lehr Court
ruled that a biological relationship alone merely provides the father with
an-opportunity to develop a substantial parent-child relationship.79 The Court
reasoned that when a putative father has failed to develop such a relation-
ship, his biological relationship does not give rise to a liberty interest worthy
of the same protection as that of a parent who has assumed significant paren-
tal duties.8" Thus, the majority concluded that Lehr's liberty interests did
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2995. The putative father registry protects the father's interest by thwart-
ing the efforts of an uncooperative mother. It also protects the anonymity and privacy of the
mother, while serving the interests of the state and the child in speedy and final adoptions
by eliminating the need for extensive searches and investigations. Nonetheless, there are disad-
vantages to a putative father registry such as New York's. For example, its purpose in ensuring
notice to putative fathers may be easily defeated in the absence of an interstate cross-referral
system. Thus, a mother and stepfather who wished to defeat the putative father's interest in
the child could simply move out of state for the adoption. In addition, the putative father
registry may protect the interests of efficiency and maternal privacy at too high a cost to the
rights of fathers and best interests of their children. See Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of
Stanley, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 528-31 (1973) [hereinafter cited Note, Strange Boundaries].
74. 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
75. Id. at 2996-97. The Court distinguished the maternal and paternal relationships in Lehr
in the following manner:
Whereas appellee had a continuous custodial responsibility for Jessica, appellant
never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with her. If one
parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent
has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause
does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal rights.
Id.
76. Id. at 2990-94.
77. Id. at 2987.
78. Id. at 2993.
79. Id. In support of its ruling, the 'majority quoted Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban:
"Parental rights do not spring full blown from biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring." Id. at 2992 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart,
J., dissenting)).
80. Id. at 2992-93. Although the Court determined that those who develop a significant
parent-child relationship will be afforded a greater degree of constitutional protection, the Court
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not require the state to include him automatically in a hearing to determine
the child's best interests.'
The Lehr Court then examined New York's statutory scheme to deter-
mine whether the procedures adequately protected Lehr's liberty interest in
establishing a responsible relationship with his child. 2 Focusing on the
classification of putative fathers entitled to notice, the majority found that
notice would be withheld from very few responsible fathers. 3 The Court
noted that any interested father could secure a right to notice by mailing
a postcard to the putative father registry." According little significance to
the fact that Lehr may have been unaware of the registry scheme, the Court
concluded that his liberty interests were adequately protected. 5 Moreover,
the Court rejected Lehr's contention that he deserved special notice because
the Ulster County court had knowledge of his paternity proceeding in
Westchester County.8 6
After determining that there was no due process violation, the Court ad-
dressed Lehr's equal protection claim. Although the statutory scheme would
always provide notice to the mother of an illegitimate child, "7 only certain
categories of putative fathers would receive notice. 8 Lehr asserted that ex-
cluding certain putative fathers from receiving notice amounted to gender-
based discrimination in violation of equal protection.89
Examining the New York statute, the Lehr Court noted that the legislature
established adoption procedures that promoted the child's best interests, pro-
tected the parent's rights, and ensured finality and promptness of adoptions.9"
implied that a putative father who has only a biological link to his child is entitled to some
lesser protection. Accordingly, the Court stated that "the mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection." Id. at 2993.
The link between parental rights and parental duty had previously been established by the
Court. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[parents'] primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder");
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (parents have "a right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations"). This con-
cept was derived from the common law. See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 452 (Ist Amer. ed. 1771) (rights of parents in their children derive from
their duties toward their children).
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2994.
82. Id. at 2994-95.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2995.
85. Id. Interestingly, the Quilloin decision espoused a different view of ignorance of the
law. The Quilloin Court declined to base its holding on the proposition that Quilloin had lost
any constitutionally protected interest by failing to petition for legitimation. The Court pointed
to evidence in the record that Quilloin was unaware of the legitimation procedure, which, if
successful, would have secured him the right to block his child's adoption. 434 U.S. at 224.
86. The Court reasoned that putative fathers were "presumptively capable of asserting and
protecting their own rights." 103 S. Ct. at 2995. According to the majority, special notice
was not required because the registry scheme was sufficient to protect Lehr's liberty interest. Id.
87. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(c) (McKinney 1977).
88. See supra note 57.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2990.
90. Id. at 2996; see also Brief for Appellant at D-3 to D-4, Lehr v. Robinson, 103 S. Ct.
2985 (1983) (letter enumerating the statute's purposes from Sen. J. Pisani, sponsor of the legisla-
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The Court further noted that a substantial parental relationship was a rele-
vant criterion in evaluating both the rights of a parent and the best interests
of a child.' The majority found that the mother in Lehr had continuous
custody of, and an established relationship with, her child.92 In contrast,
Lehr had not established a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with
his child.9 Consequently, because the mother and father were not similarly
situated in their parental relations with their child, the Court held that the
equal protection clause did not prevent the state from according the two
parents different rights.9"
Writing for the dissent, Justice White disagreed with the majority's due
process rationale." The dissent rejected the proposition that a biological rela-
tionship merely provided an opportunity to develop a relationship that would
receive substantial due process protection.96 Justice White maintained that
it was improper to examine the quality of the parent-child relationship in
order to determine whether the putative father possessed a constitutionally
protected interest in that relationship. 9" Instead, the dissent reasoned that
a biological relationship alone creates the protected liberty interest, and it
should not be subordinated to the rights of a parent who has established
a substantial relationship with the child.99 In addition, Justice White noted
that Lehr was never allowed to take part in a hearing; consequently, it was
unfair to judge the quality of his parent-child relationship in the absence
of a complete record. 9 The dissent stated that although due process would
not require actual notice to all putative fathers when an extensive search
would be necessary, there must be at least a reasonable attempt to identify
and notify such fathers.' 0
In considering the adequacy of the state's procedure, Justice White found
it unnecessary to consider the facial challenge to the statute.'"' By filing suit
to establish his paternity, Lehr had given notice to the adoption court of
his action and interest.' 2 Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that denying Lehr
tion, to Governor's Counsel). The intention of the statute was to "codify the minimum protec-
tions for the putative father which Stanley would require." Id. at D-2 (emphasis in original).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2997. The Court also rejected the assertion that the statutory distinctions among
classes of putative fathers violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 2997 n.27. Moreover,
the Court determined that such distinctions were rational and constitutionally permissible. Id.
95. Id. at 2997-3001 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined the dissent.
96. Id. at 2999 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White asserted that it was "quite untenable to con-
clude that a putative father's interest in his child is lacking in substance, . . . or ultimately
that the father's interest is not entitled to the same minimum procedural protections as the
interests of other putative fathers." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2999 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 3001 (White, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 3000 (White, J., dissenting).
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a hearing because he failed to notify the court by placing his name in the
parental registry amounted to sheer formalism.' 3 The Lehr dissent concluded
that the state's interests in the speed and finality of adoptions were not
substantially served by failing to notify a putative father whose identity and
location were known.'0 4
ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
The Lehr Court's rationale for determining a putative father's liberty in-
terest was based on a questionable application of federal precedent. Addi-
tionally, the Lehr decision continues a trend initiated in Quilloin, which
stresses the putative father's social or psychological attachment, rather than
his genetic contribution, to his child. Moreover, by substituting a subjective
standard that focuses on the extent to which a relationship has developed
for an objective examination of a biological relationship, the Lehr ruling
erodes a putative father's liberty interest in his child. After Lehr, it is uncer-
tain when a relationship is sufficient to establish a putative father's liberty
interest.
In determining whether due process guarantees apply, the Court tradi-
tionally has focused on the nature of the liberty interest involved." 5 After
determining the existence of such an interest, the Court engages in a weighing
process to determine the form of the hearing and notice required.' 6 Con-
trary to this general analysis, the Lehr Court employed a weighing process
to determine the nature of Lehr's liberty interest.' 7 As a result, the major-
ity concluded that Lehr's liberty interest was of lower quality than that of
a "developed" father.' 8 This approach ignores the holding in OFFER that
an interest which may be insufficient to receive substantive due process pro-
tection nonetheless may give rise to full procedural protection. '
The Lehr Court's rationale puts a putative father who seeks to assert a
liberty interest in his child in a difficult position. A putative father must
prove that he is entitled to a substantive liberty interest before the state must
provide him with notice of a pending adoption proceeding. Yet, it will be
difficult, if not impossible, for a putative father to demonstrate his liberty
103. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 3001 (White, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 839-42
(1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
106. See supra note 105.
107. 103 S. Ct. at 2992-93. The dissent criticized the majority's approach. Id. at 2998 (White,
J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2993-94.
109. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 842-43 n.48 (1977). The OFFER Court specifically
noted that "recognition of a liberty interest . . . for purposes of the procedural protections
of the Due Process clause would not necessarily require that [developed relationships] be treated
as fully equivalent to biological [relationships] for purposes of substantive due process review."
Id.
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interest when, as was the case in Lehr, he is not afforded an opportunity
to present evidence of a developed parent-child relationship. Ironically, under
the Lehr rationale, the mere mailing of a postcard to the New York putative
father registry establishes a sufficient parental relationship entitling the father
to notice.''" At best, this analysis appears "grudging and crabbed""' when
one considers that the adoption court had notice of Lehr's paternity claim
yet denied him an opportunity to establish his liberty interest.
Additionally, the Court's reliance on Caban, an equal protection case, to
determine Lehr's substantive due process interests is misplaced. Despite its
acknowledgement that the Caban Court failed to address the due process
claim,' 2 the Lehr majority focused on the Caban dissenting opinion to draw
a distinction, for purposes of determining Lehr's liberty interest, between
a biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility.' 3
The Court's ruling in Caban, however, provided little support for the pro-
position that a liberty interest derives from a developed relationship and not
from a biological link. Rather, the Caban Court merely ruled that when
both a putative father and mother have an established relationship with their
child, they cannot be treated unequally. 114
The Lehr Court contrasted Lehr's undeveloped relationship to the developed
relationship in Stanley. ' 5 The Stanley Court had emphasized that when a
putative father sired and raised his children,'' 6 he had a liberty interest pro-
tected by due process. Stanley, however, did not indicate that a father's liberty
interest resulted more from his psychological than from his biological rela-
tionship with his child.'" Thus, the Court's reliance upon Caban and Stanley
fails to support the notion that for purposes of determining the nature of
a liberty interest, there is a distinction between a developed and a biological
relationship.
The Lehr decision will have a substantial impact on putative fathers who
wish to establish or maintain a relationship with their children. According
greater weight to a psychological parental relationship than to a biological
one, the Court's ruling leaves unclear the extent to which a relationship must
have developed before a liberty interest will be recognized.'' 8 Further, the
110. 103 S. Ct. at 2987-88.
111. Id. at 3000 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2992 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
113. Id. The Caban Court stated that because it had found that the challenged statute violated
the equal protection clause, it was unnecessary to decide whether the statute also violated the
putative father's substantive due process rights. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16
(1979).
114. 441 U.S. at 387.
115. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
116. Id. at 651.
117. Id. at 651-52.
118. There is support for the view that the constitutionally protected family unit should be
based on social and psychological relationships with children rather than on biological or marital
ties. Poulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 910, 911 (1976); see also
Note, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 108 (1980)
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ruling apparently requires that a putative father must establish a custodial,
personal, or financial relationship before a state must notify him of a pend-
ing adoption proceeding.'' 9 Nevertheless, the majority held that a sufficient
parental relationship could be established by merely mailing a postcard or
being listed on the birth certificate. Neither of these two factors, however,
necessarily indicates the existence of a developed relationship. In ignoring
the fact that Lehr took affirmative steps to notify the court of his paternity
claim,' 20 the decision not only requires that a putative father bear the burden
of securing his right to notice, but also that the putative father strictly com-
ply with the state statutory scheme.
The Lehr decision gives states greater latitude in simplifying their adop-
tion procedures at the expense of a putative father's interest in his child.
States will not have to conduct extensive searches or investigations to locate
putative fathers who have neither become responsible parents nor filed with
the registry.' 2' Moreover, because the Lehr rationale presumes that a putative
father is capable of protecting his liberty interest,'22 it now may be un-
necessary for a mother to reveal the name of the biological father.' 23
CONCLUSION
Lehr continued the Court's recent trend of subordinating the constitutional
significance of the biological, to the psychological, parent-child relationship.
(concern for legal or biological claims to child must be subordinated to child's need for "truly
familial, psychological relationships that are so essential to his emotional health"). There are,
however, no objective standards for measuring the constitutional significance of the psychological
relationship. This lack of objective measurement necessitates that arbitrary lines be drawn or
that difficult case-by-case determinations be made. Thus, it has been suggested that the con-
stitutional rights of fathers should rest on the objective determinations of either biological or
marital ties. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 471 (1983) (favoring marital
ties); Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note 73, at 522 (favoring biological tie).
Basing a putative father's due process liberty interest on his biological link protects his in-
terest in the future companionship of his child. This interest should not be dependent on the
development of a past relationship that may have been influenced by factors beyond the father's
control. Id. The argument in favor of marriage as the objective boundary of due process pro-
tection assumes a societal interest in promoting formal, traditional family units. Thus, accord-
ing due process protection to a putative father's biological or psychological relationship overlooks
and ultimately undermines the ability of the family to perform important societal functions.
Hafen, supra, at 471.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 2996-97.
120. Id. at 2995. The Lehr dissent questioned the majority's failure to accord any weight
to the fact that Lehr, by filing his paternity suit, provided notice of his interest in the adoption
proceeding. Id. at 3000 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White found it incredible to "deny notice
and a hearing to a father who has not placed his name with the register but who has un-
mistakably identified himself by filing suit to establish his paternity and has notified the adop-
tion court of his action and his interest." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
121. 103 S. Ct. at 2994-95.
122. Id. at 2995.
123. Compelling a mother to identify the putative father of her child may involve a serious
infringement of her right to privacy. This tension between the mother's privacy rights and the
putative father's due process rights is discussed in Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and
Termination of Parental Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527 (1975).
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The Court emphasized that parental rights do not derive solely from a
putative father's biological link to his child. Rather, the putative father must
show a substantial commitment to psychological parenthood before he ac-
quires a protected liberty interest. The Court found that a putative father
registry, which allows such fathers to indicate their intent to claim pater-
nity, provides sufficient protection of a putative father's procedural due pro-
cess rights because it gives him control over securing a right to notice. Fur-
thermore, the Lehr decision recognized the registry as a practical way to
ensure a putative father's notification of his child's adoption proceeding.
Nevertheless, the Court supported its due process holding with a ques-
tionable application of federal precedent. In addition, the majority failed
to articulate a workable standard by which state courts may determine when
a putative father's relationship with his child should receive due process pro-
tection. As a result, a putative father must act to secure his procedural due
process rights or risk the adoption of his child without his knowledge or
consent. By limiting the circumstances under which putative fathers must
be notified and allowed to participate in adoption proceedings, Lehr con-
tributes to defining the parameters of such fathers' fourteenth amendment
rights. Those parameters, however, will require further definition.
Jannis E. Goodnow
